The decision of the Supreme Court extending marriage to homosexual pairs is a contradiction, not only of revelation by God, but of human nature and of the nature of mammalian biological reproduction. Setting these contradictions aside, the decision is self-inconsistent in its basis of individual liberty and of equality before the law.
The decision presents liberty as ontologically fundamental, to be moderated only by some possible, external compelling rationale. This exalting of the will over the intellect is a culminating illustration of what Pope Benedict identified as voluntarism and the dehellenization of western thought. He noted its inception in the late Middle Ages with the proposition that the will of God, as known to us, was not bound by his intellect. Previously, the binding of the intellect and the will of God was held to be one of harmonious coexistence. Now, the will of God was proposed as superior to his intellect.
The Supreme Court has declared the same holds true for the human will and intellect. This is fully consonant with the slogans of the American and French Revolutions. Life, Liberty and the Pursuit of Happiness; Liberty, Equality and Fraternity.
This exaltation of liberty, i.e. of will, not only denies the ontological harmony of truth and goodness, the ontological harmony of intellect and will, but ignores the character of human epistemology. Though acts of the human intellect and will should embody parity in harmony, the act of the intellect precedes the act of the will due to the temporal, sequential relationship of human knowledge and love.
The Court recognized a developing understanding of individual liberty, generally in its autonomy, such that individual liberty cannot be restricted except by some compelling, external rationale. Thus, civil rights, not listed or even yet understood as such, are implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution. Specifically, the traditional restriction of the right to marry to heterosexual pairs is based on no compelling rationale. Thereby, the Constitution guarantees the civil right to homosexual marriage.
The Court decision fully acknowledges the traditional restriction of marriage to heterosexual pairs, but overrides the heterosexuality in favor of liberty. This is inconsistent. In order to eliminate the heterosexual restriction, the restriction to pairs must be eliminated concomitantly. The tradition of marriage is not heterosexuality and the plural quantity, two. It is that of heterosexual pairs based on the morphology and physiology of bisexual reproduction.
The decision in favor of liberty is the declaration that bisexual reproduction is not essential to the rationale of marriage. In that declaration is the implicit elimination of the restriction to pairs. By simple logic it was incumbent upon the Court explicitly to strike down the specific plural number, two. In the light of homosexual marriage, the number two is not a pair, but is a completely arbitrary plural quantity, based on no compelling rationale. The quantity, two, is certainly not compelling on the basis of tradition, if heterosexuality is not a compelling rationale on the basis of tradition.
The Court cannot offer as an excuse that the restriction to pairs was not challenged and therefore not within the immediate purview of the Court. Heterosexual complementarity and pairing is essential to biological reproduction, whereas homosexual acts and pairing is arbitrary. The case before the Court was the Constitutionality of the restriction of marriage to heterosexuality and consequently to pairing.
Further, the Court decision bases civil rights not on the nature of man, but upon liberty, which the Court implied can be constrained only in an incidental way by other factors. The decision, eliminating the heterosexual restriction on the basis of liberty and equality before the law, acknowledges homosexual marriage as a civil right.
Historically, as a matter of civil rights, it was the traditional restriction to the number two, as a plural number, and not the restriction to heterosexual pairing, which was the initial civil rights cause in the American experience. The Mormons did not challenge heterosexual pairing. They challenged the number two as a plural number on the basis of liberty and civil rights. They did so in the middle of the nineteenth century. That is one hundred years before the civil rights campaign for homosexual marriage.
The result was the persecution of the Mormons and their fleeing from New York through the Midwest to Utah, and their final acquiescence to two as an arbitrary plural and to the denial of their civil rights in spite of the ontological preeminence of liberty. If there is a civil right to the homosexual marriage of pairs, there is a civil right to poly-spousal marriage, irrespective of the sex of the spouses.
As another illustration of the incongruity of the SCOTUS decision, consider it with respect to the traditional prohibition of marriage between close blood relatives, such as siblings. On the basis of autonomous liberty there can be no denial of the civil right of siblings of the same sex to marry because there is no external compelling reason for such a denial of liberty. In contrast, public health can be proposed as a compelling reason to deny siblings of the opposite sex the liberty to marry each other. Offspring of siblings are prone to be born with serious health defects.
In light of the Court’s decision based on individual liberty and equality before the law, we should logically hold that siblings have a civil right to homosexual marriage. However, due to the nature of biological sexual reproduction, siblings may and should be legally forbidden to enter into heterosexual marriage. Current marriage laws forbidding close blood relatives to marry must be revised due to their unconstitutionality in light of the Supreme Court’s understanding of liberty. Consistency requires the law to permit homosexual marriage and to prohibit heterosexual marriage between close blood relatives.